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1 Abstract
Physics is about the mathematical previsions of natural events.
Physicists are very careful to make predictions about the actions of living beings, as living beings
have a non-trivial behaviour and it is very hard to describe it with equations.
Anyway in modern literature some work of this kind emerges. Most of this work studies the be-
haviour of simple microorganisms or they are based on a large number of collected data in order
to make probabilistic or statistical studies.
Neither of these approaches were possible in the analysis of the geopolitical nuclear deterrence
stability between states, because the behaviour of a state is much more complex with respect to
the examples mentioned before and, luckily, no statistic of that kind of events can be made.
In this paper we are going to propose a physical model that can represent a simple deterrence
equilibrium situation, it is on based theory of unitary rational actors [1].
This theory takes in account that a state is composed of a large number of people and a detailed
study of the dynamics of any individual it is impossible: no equation can describe the behaviour of
a single person and, also if this is possible, the problem may have a too large number of variables
to be solved. For this reason the theory of unitary rational actor was developed. But for the same
reason this approach is criticized [5] [6]. In fact it is very hard to consider the whole range of
psychological and sociologistic factors, such as mental quirks, etc...
This situation, in Physics, is similar for gases, which are composed by a huge number of molecules
and the study dynamics for one is impossible.
Then a common approach, in this case, is the thermodynamics one. We only look to the macro-
scopic properties of the gas such as pressure, temperature and volume.
We want to emphasize that these quantities are strictly related to average behaviour of particles,
but to estimate them, it is not necessary to known the state of every body that compose the gas.
Then in this sense thermodynamics could help to use theory of unitary rational actors also con-
sidering some non-rational factors.
Firstly we are going to see how this model represents the Mutual assured destruction (MAD) the-
ory [2][3][4] if the influence of internal (economical, political,due to non state actors) instability
and o conventional military forces are not taken in account. Secondly we are going to consider
the factors just mentioned in our model and we are going to study their influence on deterrence
stability: MAD will not be anymore effective.
Finally we emphasize that the proposed model can simulate the reaction to the interest of a neigh-
bour state or the international community on the deterrence equilibrium situation. This will be
made through the concept of environment, in particular this work we are going to suppose that is
a thermal bath that keeps the temperature of the system fixed, and temperature as the “average“
interest of states outside the system on the system itself.
In particular we are going to apply this model to the India-Pakistan deterrence equilibrium and
see how the influence of the soft international diplomacy can change the situation.
2 The model
A gas can be described using a small number of macroscopic variables: temperature (T ) , pressure
(p), numbers of moles (n), volume occupied by a gas (V ), ect.
The most important is the pressure, that represents the total pressure that a state could make on
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another state, this quantity can be composed of different contribution, e.g. an economical pressure
due to an embargo or military pressure due to its nuclear arsenal, etc.
In order to study equilibrium we propose the following simple model : consider a cylinder, with
volume V , divided in two parts (V1 and V2) by an adiabatic (no heat can be exchanged through
the wall), free to move and frictionless wall. Now suppose to fill the two volumes with two different
gases and to fix the external temperature T , then at equilibrium the pressures of two gas must be
the same:
p1 = p2. (1)
This is quite good in our context, because an equilibrium can exist if and only if the geopolitical
pressure is the same between two different states. This is the reason why the pressure, in our model,
is be the discriminant on the existence of an equilibrium: if a state makes to much ( or too littll)
pressure it would be very hard to reach equilibrium with another state.
To determine the pressure that a state is able to do, we use a state equation: a constitutive
mathematical relation, thats gives the possibility to estimate one of the parameters if the others
are knowns .
Filling the two volumes with real gases (i.e. Van der Waals gases [8]), their pressure is:
pi =
njRT
Vj − njbj −
ajn
2
j
V 2j
, (2)
j = 1, 2.
Before looking deeply in equation (2) it is necessary to understand how we associate the parameters
that describe a physical gas to a geopolitical context.
• R is a physical constant, that represents the nuclear deterrence of a state.
• nj is number of moles, it describe the amount of particles in the gas. In the purposed model
it represents the capability of a state, an high value of n indicates a powerful (e.g. great
gross national product) state.
• T is the temperature of the gas and also of the external environment. Physically it describe
the average agitation of particles that compose a gas. Pressure is directly proportional to
temperature, so a state with high average agitation has more pressure.
• Vj is the volume occupied by a gas. We will call it strategic volume. Fixed all the other quan-
tities the volume of a ”geopolitical” gas will represents its relative weight in an equilibrium
situation. e.g. let’s suppose that the volume of the cylinder, at equilibrium, is shared in such
way that V1V = 0.666 this means that for the equilibrium the state 1 is twice more important
that state 2. We want emphasize that the relation V1 > V2 does not means that state 1
is more powerful than state 2, but that its role is more crucial for the strategic deterrence
equilibrium.
• bj corresponds to the intrinsic volume of atoms and molecules of the gas. This term keeps in
account low range repulsive forces which oppose to the compression of the gas.
In Geopolitical analogy it is a critical parameter, because a gas can be compressed until it
reaches njbj value, if this occurs it describes a dramatical situation, since not equilibrium
can anymore occur. bj can represent the internal instability of a state.
States with high value of bj are brought more easily to committing unrepairable mistakes,
since a lower external pressure can bring this gas near njbj critical value.
• aj represents a low range attractive force that reduce the pressure of a gas, aj is positive
definite. In Geopolitics the situation is quite different; we assume that aj can be both positive
or negative.
If aj > 0 reduces the pressure of a gas, so positive value of aj can be interpreted as a stability
factor.
Otherwise if aj < 0 is a destabilizing factor.
Let’s look at equation (2) it is trivial that the pressure is composed by two terms.
First term gives high contribution to the geopolitical pressure if we are dealing with a large amount
of strategic deterrence weapons (large n) or if the temperature is high. In geopolitical analogy we
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relate this contribution to the pressure made by the strategic nuclear deterrence of a state, In this
case the therm gives a lower contribution if bj has a big value. So we can imagine that a state with
internal problems is less influent on the balance of deterrence through its strategical weapons.
Then can be useful to parametrize bj , as it is possible to distinguish from different contributions
to the internal instability of state:
bj = beco + bnsa + bstab, (3)
every term of the last equation is positive, beco represents the contribution from economical
problems, bnsa represents the contribution due to non-state actors and bstab is the contribution
due to internal political problems.
The behavior of the second term, −ain2i
V 2i
, depends on the signs of the parameter aj , as if aj < 0, it
gives a positive contribute to the pressure, otherwise if ai > 0.
Hence, as before, let’s parametrize aj :
aj = amil + adip, (4)
where amil is lesser than zero and represents the conventional military contribution, while adip
is bigger than zero and represents diplomatic actions that reduce the pressure.
3 Equilibrium equations
We solved equation (2) respect V1 in different limits to simulate different strategic behaviors.
Firstly we impose a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = 0 then equilibrium condition becomes:
R1n1
R2n2
=
V2
V1
, (5)
the last equation represents a strategic equilibrium equation, since in this case we suppose
that only the strategic nuclear weapons influence the equilibrium. Last equation tells us that the
ratio between strategic volumes and number of strategic deterrence mechanisms multiplied by the
capability, is the same. The most important conclusion that can be draw is that equilibrium does
always occur. Indeed the unique case in which a nuclear war can break out is the one where one of
the two state does not have a nuclear strategic weapon. This is in good approximation with MAD
theory.
The other case that we take in account is the one in which n1 = n2 = 1, a1 = 0, R1 = R2 and
b2 = 0. Equation becomes (2):
n1RT
V1 − n1b1 =
n2RT
V2 − n2b2 −
a2n
2
2
V 22
. (6)
This equation represents a simplified deterrence and strategic equilibrium of an asymmetric
Geopolitical situation.
The hypothesis was made to fit a existing situation of equilibrium among India and Pakistan. For
sake of relevancy to the real situation, from now we interchange index 1 with index p (since refers
to Pakistan) and index 2 with i (refers to India).
Then imposing R1 = R2 and ni = np = 1 we assume that both states have enough nuclear
deterrence to annihilate each other and the state capability it is similar (not true in reality but
the first aim of this work it is tu study the influence of others factors on equilibrium, the study of
assymetric nuclear and economical situation will be adress to fututre works). Furthermore ap = 0
means there is not a substantial conventional military pressure on India made by Pakistan.
Finally we set bi = 0, India in this model does not have a critical volume. This means on one hand
that any pressure from Pakistan can not convince India to make the first use of a nuclear weapons,
on the other hand that India does not have rouge state behaviors or internal economical problems
of concern [7].
We solve this equation with respect to Vp, fixing T = 1K, V = 10L, using as parameters, repre-
senting the Geopolitical situation, ai and bp. In figure 1 it is possible to see one solution (system
has two roots, one for our purpose is meaningless).
In figure 2, we can see sections of the previous graph, obtained fixing one parameter.
Looking at these graphs one should keep in mind that Vp = 0 means that in such points of pa-
rameters space is not possible to find Physical (e.g. real) solutions of equation (1) (we set Vp = 0
in these cases in order to make graph, a priori this situation is the liquefaction of one of the two
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gases and volume can be a complex number).
Then Geopolitically in these points no kind of strategic and deterrence equilibrium can be achieved.
To use this graph one must estimate ai and bp of the real situation, then using figure 1 it is possible
to say if with these estimated values there exists a strategic and deterrence equilibrium and how
far is this point from the cliff.
For example, one looking at the real situation estimates bp = 0.5, then figure 1 shows for which
value of ai there is an equilibrium.
In particular let’s consider figure 2.b where bp is fixed at 0.5, then it is possible says for ai ≤ −4
India’s conventional military pressure is too much for the existence of an equilibrium. Otherwise
if −4 < ai < 0 we have a conventional military pressure from India, by the way equilibrium can
occur. It is important to notice that an ai decreasing represents the escalation dominance of India,
an increase of conventional military power in order to assure a rapid dominance in war scenery.
From these results we can say that escalation dominance could be a threat for equilibrium.
Eventually for ai > 0, India tries a diplomatic détente, for bp = 0.5 there is always equilibrium.
Another example is figure 2.a, in this case suppose, a priori, to estimate ai = 0.5, then only if
bp < 0.75 an equilibrium is possible.
What further information can be extracted from figure 1?
Since ai can be both positive and negative we can distinguish between two cases.
If ai > 0 in this case the term − aiV 2i gives a negative contribution to pi, then this region represents
a situation where India tries a diplomatic détente. An interesting fact is that also in this case a
nuclear war can occur when bp is large enough. This means that internal (economical or political)
instability or the action of non-state actor are sufficient to cause a dramatic situation even thought
India’s distress actions.
If ai < 0 the term − aiV 2i gives a positive contribution to pi. This behaviour simulates that the
conventional military force of India makes some pressure on Pakistan. Luckily, also in this case
equilibrium can occur, obviously bigger ai is lesser the value of bp must be in order to make equi-
librium possible.
Then our model shows that the most important issue for reaching a geopolitical stability in South-
Asia area is the presence of non-state actors or internal instability of a state. The presence of
nuclear powers in the area is not mainly cause of instability and it is not sufficient to be cause of
a war.
Note also that the strategic volume of Pakistan is bigger than India’s one, this means that the role
of Pakistan is more important in this situation and the priority should be the “stabilization” of
Pakistan internal politic.
These results are important since our model supposes that a state is a unitary actor but shows that
factors due to instability or conventional military forces are fundamental to reach an equilibrium,
usually this kind of factors are taken away using the unitary actors theory.
4 The role of temperature.
As it was said before one aim of this work is to study a geopolitical situation between two states
considering also the interference made by other states.
The main advantage in using a thermodynamics toy model is the reservoir. In fact if we put the
system into a reservoir, then the temperature of the system becomes the same temperature of
environment, then we are considering a thermal bath.
So it is possible to simulate the action of neighbour state as a different temperature. In previous
section we set arbitrary T = 1K, that condition will represent a situation where the system (i.e.
the two state) has a low interaction with other states: the attention of international establishment
or of neighbour state is elsewhere; then we can figure out that a temperature increase represents
a political interest on the system from external state actors, this can be a good approximation
because before we said that T is the average agitation of the components of a gas, then attention
of external states can enlarge the worries of the state that compose the system, so this will cause
a temperature increase.
This analogy has advantages and disadvantages, actually it is possible to study a problem that
considers more than two states without working with a multi-bodies (three or more) problem,
but this assumption works if and only if we are dealing with external actors that are not heavily
influenced by changes in the system. In other words reservoir does not changes its temperature
if there are changes in the system. In Geopolitics this is a good approximation when we suppose
that an external actor is very powerful (economically and military) in comparison of states in the
system.
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Figure 1: Vp in function of ai and bp with T = 1K and total volume V = 10L.
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(a) Vp in function of bp with ai = 0.5, T = 1K and
total volume V = 10L..
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(b) Vp in function of ai with bp = 0.5, T = 1K and
total volume V = 10L.
Figure 2: Sections of figure 1.
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For these reasons in India-Pakistan equilibrium can be again a good example to test our model,
because the role of reservoir can be made by Internatiol soft diplomacy, infact we can say that the
international establishment is not affected too much by the situation between India and Pakistan.
For sake of understanding we set arbitrary T ∈ [1K, 100K].
In figure 3 is possible to see the same figure 1, viewed from above, evaluated at different tempera-
tures (remember that figure 1 is evaluated at T = 1K).
Look in particular 3(d) with external high temperature (T = 100K) the model shows a particular
behavior.
First of all, equilibrium can exist for any value of ai, from a mathematical point of view, with this
temperature, the contribution of the term ai
V 2i
is small compared to the others (in both cases, if it
is an stabilizing factor or not).
This fact could mean that if the international establishment gets interested in the area (then T
is high), then India spreads its energy and loses the interest in making pressure on Pakistan with
conventional military power.
Hence this intervention, in our model, reduces the pressure on Pakistan.
Note also that in some points in the plane (ai, bp) where at T = 1K equilibrium solutions do not
exists, for high temperatures these points may have solution. For these reasons an international
intervention, in this model, is a stabilizing factor.
On the other hand, in this case (T = 100K), there exists a critical value of bp (i.e. bcri = 0.71),
when bp > bcri equilibrium can not occur independently on any actions.
This represents that there exists a break point of Pakistani problems, if Pakistan has too many
internal problems (economical or political) or too much rouge state behavior a potential war might
breaks out, regardless of international peacemaking efforts.
In other words, a international strong intervention could dramatically change the scenery, it could
make inefficient the effects of India’s conventional military pressure on Pakistan (i.e. the equilib-
rium point exists despite the value of ai), for this reason due to this action it is possible to have
some equilibrium points that would not exist otherwise. However Pakistani problems can always
be source of instability for all South Asia area.
5 Conclusion
The proposed model through gases enables to simulate different behaviors. In one limit, where no
“weight” is associated to conventional military power or to internal instability source, it simulates
the MAD theory, since no war might break out (equilibrium always exists) until both state has a
nuclear strategic deterrence.
Otherwise this model is able to represents an asymmetric situation where one state has a large
conventional military power and no internal problem and the other has only internal stability is-
sues and a negligible conventional military compared to the other. In this case using this model
to represent the deterrence equilibrium between Pakistan and India shows how this asymmetry is
source of instability for the whole area. The model is able to incorporate these factors even if it is
based on unitary actors theory, in particular we saw the effect of Pakistani non-actor state, India’s
diplomacy and escalation dominance. We conclued that the best option for India is the diplomatic
one but the key role is adressed to Pakistan’s internal problem.
The last advantage of this model is the possibility to simulate the action of a powerful neigh-
bour state through the temperature of the thermal bath. In this case we showed that international
soft diplomacy intervention could be a strong stabilizing factor for the Pakistan-India equilibrium
issue, but the key role is again addressed to the Pakistani internal problems. These problems
are discriminant for the existence of the equilibrium and could be a source of war even with a
strong external intervention, so our idea is that priority should be given to solve Pakistani internal
problems to reach a long term stability in the South-Asia area.
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Figure 3: Vp in function of ai, bp =, at different temperature, seen from above. At the first row
starting from left we T = 1 [K] and T = 3.5 [K], indeed the second row T = 25 [K] and T = 100
[K]. The brown area are places in parameters space where Vp = 0.
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